We investigate a hierarchy of arithmetical structures obtained by transfinite addition of a canonic universal predicate, where the canonic universal predicate for M is defined as a minimum universal predicate for M in terms of definability. We determine the upper bound of the hierarchy and give a characterisation for the sets definable in the hierarchy.
Introduction
In his fundamental works, Bernard Bolzano develops the idea that all natural languages are approximations of a single universal language; a language in which we can describe anything that exists or that could exist. The idea was not new at Bolzano's time and it still persists, at least as a call in the hearts of logicians. However, if there is a general conclusion which can be drawn from the results related to the Gödel theorem then it is this: there is no universal language. For any language L, there exists at least one thing that cannot be fully described in the language: the semantics of L itself. In this paper, we shall be working with firstorder languages interpreted over natural numbers, but we believe that some of the results are valid in general. Let M be a first-order structure with a countable language interpreted over ω. According to the well-known theorem of Tarski, the truth predicate for M (i.e., the set of Gödel numbers of sentences true in M) is not definable in M. It must be noted that this proposition does not merely assert that there is a set which cannot be defined in M, but it gives an example of such a set; and moreover, the set, as a description of the semantics of M, is presupposed in the structure M itself. If we take a structure M 0 and the truth predicate T 0 for M 0 then the structure M 1 := M 0 + T 0 will be stronger then M 0 . Moreover, it is an extension in a sense presupposed already in the structure M 0 . Similarly we can define M 2 := M 1 +T 1 etc. and we can even imagine that we iterate the process transfinitely and obtain an infinite hierarchy of structures {M α }. The structures in the hierarchy are natural extensions of M 0 and it makes sense to ask what are the properties of such a hierarchy, which sets are definable at some stage of the sequence etc. The notion of the hierarchy, however, is a reminiscence of the idea of the universal language, and it must inevitably lead into difficulties. The first and main problem is that the notion 'truth for M' is not determined uniquely. More generally, we want the structure M α+1 to be obtained as 'M α +'the description of the semantics of M α '. However, the notion 'the description of the semantics of M α ' is not unambivalent, as there may exist infinitely many sets which may be said to describe the semantics of M α . It is an obvious move to try to chose a particular, canonic, description of semantics of M α and define the hierarchy in terms of adding the canonic description. Two alternative definitions of such a description will be given below under the headings canonic universal predicate and proper canonic universal predicate. Of course, we must then answer the question whether such a canonic choice is possible, i.e., we must determine whether a (proper) canonic universal predicate for a given M exists, and this problem will form the major part of the present paper.
For rather technical reasons (explained on page 7) the truth predicate itself is not exactly suitable for the purpose of defining a hierarchy, and we shall thus define the hierarchy in a related but different way. Moreover, we shall investigate two kinds of hierarchies, one obtained using a proper universal predicate, and the other using a universal predicate for M . Let D(M) ⊆ P(ω) denote the set of all (first-order) definable sets in M, then 1 
G ⊆ ω
2 is a universal predicate for M iff D(M) ⊆ {G(n, .); n ∈ ω} 2. P ⊆ ω 2 is a proper universal predicate for M iff D(M) = {P (n, .); n ∈ ω}.
Evidently, a (proper) universal predicate for M is not definable in M; but it must be observed that neither P nor G are unique for a given M. Moreover, P or G can be chosen in such a way that the structures M + P and M + G can have an arbitrary strength. In order to avoid the problem we introduce a canonic (proper) universal predicate as a minimum (proper) universal predicate in the following sense P 0 is a canonic (proper) universal predicate for M iff 1. P 0 is a (proper) universal predicate for M and 2. for every (proper) universal predicate P for M, P 0 is definable in M + P .
The obvious question is whether the canonic universal or canonic proper universal predicates exist. The answer, which is partially given in this paper, is non-trivial: there are structures which have a canonic (proper) universal predicate and there are countable structures which do not. Further, the two concepts are not equivalent and there are structures which possess a canonic proper universal predicate but do not have a canonic universal predicate.
For a given countable structure N we shall define the Tarski hierarchy 2 over N to be a sequence of structures {M α } α≤λ(N ) such that
λ(N ) is the maximum ordinal satisfying 1)-3).
An analogous hierarchy obtained by replacing the notion canonic universal predicate by that of canonic proper universal predicate and λ(N ) by λ p (N ) will be called proper Tarski hierarchy over N . In essence, proper Tarski hierarchy can be viewed as a sequence of truth predicates.
The key characteristic of the Tarski hierarchy is the ordinal λ(N ). A priori, we know that λ(N ) ≤ ℵ 1 , as an uncountable structure cannot have a universal predicate. If λ(N ) = ℵ 1 then every countable structure obtained by the process of adding a canonic universal predicate does possess a canonic proper universal predicate. If, on the other hand, we have λ(N ) < ℵ 1 then the structure M λ does not have a canonic universal predicate.
The basic properties of the proper Tarski hierarchy can be obtained from [1] . The authors define the hierarchy as a sequence of Turing degrees {H α } α<ξ . On the isolated steps they take for H α+1 simply the Turing jump for H α and the minimum-proper-universal-predicate question enters on the limit steps. But in essence, their definition is equivalent to the notion of Tarski hierarchy adopted here. 3 In particular, using the techniques developed in their paper, it can be shown that for every countable N the ordinal λ p (N ) is a countable limit ordinal. An alternative approach to proper Tarski hierarchy and a comparison of Tarski and proper Tarski hierarchy can be found in [3] .
In this paper we shall be concerned mainly with the Tarski hierarchy. We shall prove the following main results 1 If X ⊆ ω 2 and n ∈ ω, we set X(n, .) := {m ∈ ω; X(n, m)}. 2 We use the name of Tarski because he was the first one to state the undefinability of truth. I am not aware that he would ever attempt to iterate the process of adding the truth predicate finitely or transfinitely.
3 Let {Hα} be the sequence of Turing degrees in the sense of [1] and let {Mα} be a proper Tarski hierarchy over A. The interrelation between the hierarchies is based on the following fact: if M β= Hγ, where= is understood in terms of Turing reducibility, then M β+1= H γ+ω . Since every element in Hα is finite, there is no counterpart in {Hα} to M β if β is a limit. But it is trivial to find some γ such that M β+1= Hγ . the first undefinable (i.e., non-recursive) ordinal in N , and the structure M λ(N ) is the minimal structure containing all sets implicitly definable in N .
We shall note that the structure M λ(N ) is at the same time the smallest structure containing all sets ∆ The part of Theorem 1 asserting that λ(N ) ≥ Ord(N ) is proved as Theorem 20. That the structure M Ord(N ) is the smallest structure containing all implicitly definable sets in N is claimed in Theorem 21 and proved on page 19. Finally, the fact that M Ord(N ) does not have a canonic universal predicate and hence λ(N ) = Ord(N ) is claimed in Theorem 22 and we prove it on page 21. Theorem 2 is contained in Theorem 37 and Corollary 2 of Theorem 20.
We must emphasize that in the case of proper Tarski hierarchy the ordinal λ p (N ) is much larger than the first non-recursive ordinal in N . Consequently, the proper Tarski hierarchy over N does not coincide with the sets hyperarithmetical in N . Though true, it is not therefore evident that the Tarski hierarchy does stop at the first non-recursive ordinal.
General notions
In this paper, We take a structure to be a set of predicates and function symbols where we assume predicates and function symbols to be inherently interpreted. In addition, we assume predicates and function symbols to be interpreted on the natural numbers ω, i.e. the standard model of natural numbers. Finally, we shall deal only with structures of basic strength, i.e. those in which all the usual arithmetical operations are definable.
Definition 1
1. Let n > 0. Then P = A, n is (n-ary) predicate iff A ⊆ ω n ; n will be called the arity of P and A its extension . A, n will also be denoted by n A.
2. Let n ≥ 0. Then F = f, n is (n-ary) function symbol iff f : ω n → ω is a total n-ary function from ω n to ω; if n = 0 we assume f ∈ ω; n will be called the arity of F and n its extension . f, n will also be denoted by n f .
Definition 2 1.
The arithmetic, A, is the set of predicates and function symbols, {=, <, S, +, .}, interpreted in the usual way over ω.
2. M is a structure iff M is a set of predicates and function symbols and A ⊆ M P, F will denote the set of all predicate resp. function symbols. For a structure M, we set P(M) := P ∩ M and P(F ) := F ∩ M. P n , F n denotes the set of n-ary predicates resp. of function symbols.
If Y is a set of predicates and function symbols then
The first order variables(or simply just variables) are the elements of the set {x i ; i ∈ ω}. The elements of the set {X k i ; i, k ∈ ω} are the second-order variables, k is the arity of the variable X k i . For binary logical connectives we shall take ∧, ∨, ≡, ⇒ and ¬ is the unary connective. The symbols for quantifiers are ∃ and ∀.
Syntactical concepts, terms, formulae etc are defined in the usual way. Formula scheme is simply a second-order formula with no second-order quantifications; we shall never need formulae of higher order. A formula scheme ψ will be written as The class of all formulae with n free variables (resp. the class of formulae with n free variables of a structure M) will be denoted by F le n (resp. F le
The definitions of a formula being true or satisfied by a sequence of natural numbers will be left to the reader.
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In the obvious manner we introduce partial function
Definition 4 Let M, N be structures.
. . a n ∈ ω n ; a 1 , . . . a n satisf ies ψ}
We say that
3. The set of all X ⊆ ω definable in M will be denoted by D(M).
We say
The classes of equivalence of the relation ∼ will be called definability classes.
Let
Since we assume that structures have at least the strength of arithmetic we can find a simple coding function
which enables us to express quantification over finite sets and sequences of numbers. For a sequence a 1 , . . . a n the number [a 1 , . . . a n ] will be called the code or the Gödel number of the sequence a 1 , . . . a n . For A = {a 1 , . . . a n }, [A] will denote the code of the sequence
. . s n , where s i are sequences or finite sets of numbers then
An important consequence is that inductively specified sets are definable, as we state in the following lemma.
iff a is the code of a sequence y 0 , . . . y n ∈ ω such that for every j ≤ n either
Proof. Easy. QED
Truth and universal predicates
We have introduced notions which describe semantics and syntax of a structure. The notions are settheoretical and hence they cannot be directly taken as predicates or functions which are assumed to range over natural numbers. In order to be able to define something like 'the jump operator' we must formulate concepts which describe properties of a structure by means of predicates defined on natural numbers. For this purpose we define (proper) universal predicate for M and the truth predicate for M under a coding c, T r M,c . For a relation R ⊆ ω 2 and a ∈ ω, R(a, .) will denote the set {x ∈ ω; R(a, x)}. For relations of bigger arity similarly.
2 G will be called a universal predicate for M.
P is a proper universal set for M iff P is a universal set and for every
2 P will be called a proper universal predicate for M.
Let G be a universal set for
We can view a universal set as a list of subsets of ω G(0, .), G(1, .), G (2, .) . . . such that every definable set in M occurs in this list. If G is a proper universal set then also every member of that list is definable in M. Consequently, a proper universal predicate enables us to express quantifications over definable sets in M, while the universal set enables us to express quantifications over a class containing all definable sets in M.
Proposition 4 Let M be a structure. Let G be a universal predicate for M. Then
G is not definable in M.

Proof. 1) is obvious. 2) is well-known. QED
A (proper) universal predicate for M determines what are the definable sets in M, but does not show what is the internal structure of M, what predicates and functions are in M etc. On the other hand, the notion of truth predicate for M under a coding c which we introduce below is a complete description of M. Two structures which define the same sets, M 1 ∼ M 2 , have the same (proper) universal predicates but in general will possess different truth predicates. This relation between truth predicate and proper universal predicate is expressed in the Proposition 6.
Definition 6 Let M be a structure. A one-to-one function c : M → ω will be called a coding for M.
Let c be a coding for M. Then c : M ∪ ( logical symbols ) → ω is the one-to-one function such that: 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15 
⊆ ω is the set of codes of n-tuples a 1 , . . . a n such that a 1 , . . . a n ∈ Ext(X) (where the arity of X is n if X ∈ P n , and Proposition 5 Let M be a structure, c be a coding for M.
The following are
Proof. 1), 3) and 4) are an easy application of Lemma 3. 2) is immediate. QED Proposition 6 Let M be a structure and c a coding for M. Then
there exists a proper universal predicate for
is ∆ 1 -definable and it is a universal set for M.
2) The proof is an application of Lemma 3 and proceeds as follows. For a formula ψ ∈ F le(M), a sequence a 1 , . . . a k ∈ ω will be called a formula derivation for ψ iff i) a i is a c-code of a string ψ i , i = 1, . . . i, and a k = [ψ] c and ii) for every i ≤ k either ψ i is an atomic formula or there are i 1 , i 2 < i and ψ i = (ψ i1 )△(ψ i2 ), where △ is a binary logical connective, or ψ = △(ψ i1 ), where △ is ¬ or ∃y, ∀y.
A sequence a 1 , e 1 . . . a k , e k ∈ ω will be called a truth derivation for ψ iff i) a 1 , . . . a k is a formula derivation for ψ and ii) if
The proof of Proposition 5,1) requires to show that every formula of M has a formula derivation and the set of codes of formula derivations is definable in A + 2 Rng(c). Here, it must be shown that every formula of M has a truth derivation and that the set of codes of truth derivations is definable in M + G + 2 D M,c . Both parts are straightforward. Finally, a [ψ] c ∈ T r M,c iff [ψ] c ∈ F le 0 (M) c and ψ has a truth derivation a 1 , e 1 . . . a k , e k such that G(e k , .) = ∅. QED Corollary Let M be a structure, c a coding for M. Then
Every set definable in
M is ∆ 1 -definable in A + 1 T r M,c .
T r M,c is not definable in M.
Proof. Follows from the previous Proposition and Proposition 4. QED Definition 8 Let M be a structure. The following lemma expresses the key property of L-finite structures.
iff a is a code of n-tuple a 1 , . . . a n and a 1 , . . . a n ∈ Ext(P ). Analogically, if F i ∈ F n (M), i ≤ k then there is ψ s+i a ∆ 1 -formula such that for every a ∈ ω, a ∈ Ext(ψ s+i ) iff a = [a 1 , . . . a n+1 ] and a 1 , . . . a n , a n+1 ∈ Ext(F ).
Let t 1 , . . . t s and t s+1 , . . . t s+k denote the numerals corresponding to c(P 1 ), . . . c(P s ) and c(
Proof. Follows from the previous Lemma and Proposition 5.QED For a given structure, by different choices of coding c we can obtain different truth predicates, and the structure M + 1 T r M,c will have different expressive powers. Similarly for (proper) universal predicates; in particular, if M is a structure and B ⊆ ω is any given set then we can find a (proper) universal predicate for M such that B is definable in M + 2 G. We see that neither the universal nor the proper universal predicate can have the role of 'the jump operator' for M, for such an operation would not be unique. It is then an expectable move to try to choose a particular (proper) universal predicate which would be in some sense the weakest. This is achived using the concepts of canonic universal predicate and canonic proper universal predicate which have been defined on page 2.
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Lemma 8 Let M be a structure.
7 Note that we do not introduce the symmetric concept of canonic truth predicate. The reason is that if we defined the Tarski hieararchy (see page 2) using the canonic truth predicate then the Theorem 10 is false, ie. there would exist many incomparable hierarchies over N . In particular, for any B ⊆ ω we could find a Tarski hierarchy {Mα} α<λ(N ) (defined in terms of canonic truth predicate) such that ω < λ(N ) and B is definable in Mω. 
Assume that there is a coding
Proof. By Lemma 8 it is sufficient to show that D N ,c is definable in M. But that is claimed in Lemma 7. QED Recall the definitions of Tarski and proper Tarski hierarchy given on page 2. Since for a given structure there in general exist infinitely many canonic (proper) universal predicates, neither the Tarski hierarchy nor the proper Tarski hierarchy are defined uniquely. The following Theorem shows that the hierarchies are unique at least up to the equivalence ∼. A priori, we see that λ(N ) and λ p (N ) can at most be equal to ℵ 1 , the first uncountable ordinal. For then the structure M ℵ1 is uncountable and there exist no truth or proper universal predicate for M ℵ1 and we cannot hope to extend the hierarchies above ℵ 1 . The crucial question concerning the Tarski hierarchy and proper Tarski hierarchy is this: is λ(N ) countable? If it is then the structure M ℵ1 is a countable structure which does not have a canonic proper universal predicate and the proper Tarski hierarchy cannot be extended above λ(N ). If λ(N ) = ℵ 1 then we may say that the Tarski hierarchy does not have an upper bound.
Theorem 11
Let N be a L-finite structure. Let {M α } α<λ(N ) be a Tarski hierarchy over N . Let α < λ(N ). Then M α+1 is essentially finite. Hence α + 1 < λ(N ) and λ(N ) is a limit ordinal. The same is true for the proper Tarski hierarchy.
Proof. M α+1 = M α + P , where P is a universal predicate. But M α + P ∼ D A + P , from Proposition 4, 1). Hence M α+1 is essentially finite, it has a canonic universal predicate and α + 1 < λ(N ) QED
Ordinals and the first part of Theorem 1
In this section we will prove that for a (proper) Tarski hierarchy over N there is Ord(N ) ≤ λ(N ) (resp. Ord(N ) ≤ λ p (N )).
Definition 10 Let M be a structure. Let λ, µ ∈ ω <ω .
A ⊆
A will be called a definable system in M iff it is defined by some ψ ∈ F le
n is a proper implicit definition of A iff ψ defines the system {A}. 3. B ∈ P (ω µ ) is implicitly definable in M iff there exist A ∈ P (ω λ ), A has a proper implicit definition in M and B is definable in the structure M + λ A.
Let
That F is definable in M we introduce in the obvious way.
is a proper implicit definition of F iff for every
We will say that F is implicitly definable in M iff there are functions
We may observe that
are definable in M then they have a proper implicit definition in M. If they have a proper implicit definition in M then they are implicitly definable in M.
. if B ∈ P (ω λ ) and F : P (ω λ ) → P (ω µ ) are definable resp. implicitly definable in M then F (B) is definable resp. implicitly definable in M.
The following statement will not be used in this work but it gives an important characterisation of implicitly definable sets. We therefore do not enter the proof.
Proof. The implication '→' is obvious. The other follows from Lemma 32. QED Lemma 12 Let M be a structure, λ, µ ∈ ω <ω .
Let B ∈ P (ω λ ) be implicitly definable in M. Then there exists A ⊆ ω, A has a proper implicit definition in M and B is definable in
Proof. Straightforward. QED Definition 11 Let M and N be structures. Then
M is implicitly closed iff every set which is implicitly definable in M is definable in M.
I(M) is the structure
M + { 1 X; X ⊆ ω, X implicitly definable in M}.
Corollary of Lemma 12 Let M be a structure. Let N := I(M). Then i) N is implicitly closed, ii) D(M) ⊆ D(N ) and iii) for every
. Proof. Let M be given. By Lemma 12, 2) if a set is implicitly definable in I(M) then it is implicitly definable in M. Hence I(M) is implicitly closed. The rest is immediate. QED
Proposition 13
There is a function T R : P (ω 2 ) → P (ω) which has a proper implicit definition in A such that for every structure M and a coding c for M we have
Proof. First, observe that Proposition 5,3) can be strengthened to assert that there exists a function V AL : P (ω 2 ) → P (ω 2 ) definable in A such that for every structure M and a coding c for M,
Let M be a structure and c its coding. Then X = T r M,c iff X ⊆ F le 0 (M) c and for every x = [ψ] c ∈ F le 0 (M) c the following conditions are satisfied 1. If ψ = P (n 1 , . . . n i ) is atomic and n l is the n l -th numeral then
c ∈ X and so on for the other logical connectives.
Let S ∈ F le 2,1 (A) be a formula scheme obtained as a natural translation of the above conditions and by replacing every occurence of Proof. Apply Proposition 9 on L-finite structure N such that N ∼ M to show that a universal predicate for M is implicitly definable in M. That a universal predicate is not definable in M is claimed in Proposition 6. QED
We shall see that one of the important characteristics of a structure is how many ordinals are definable in the structure. We shall say that R is a linear ordering on X iff R is reflexive, transitive, and weakly antisymmetric on X and for every x, y ∈ X, R(x, y) or R(y, x). R is a linear ordering iff R is a linear ordering on Rng(R). Thus we take a linear ordering to be non-strict. In order to avoid confusion, we shall also write R instead of R. x ≺ R y is then defined as x R y and x = y. Note that for a linear ordering we have Rng(R) = Dom(R). If X ⊆ Rng(R) then we define R⌈X := R ∩ X 2 . If n ∈ Rng(R) then R n will denote the relation such that R n (x, y) iff R(x, y) and R(y, n) Definition 12 Let ρ ⊆ ω 2 be a linear ordering, let α be a countable ordinal.
1. Then ρ is a representation of ordinal α iff ≺ ρ is a well-ordering of the order-type α.
2. Let β < α. Then ρ β will be defined by induction as follows: let ρ 0 := a, a the ρ-smallest member of Rng(R). If β > 0, let ρ β be the ρ-smallest member of the set Rng(ρ) \ {ρ γ ; γ < β}.
3. Let β ≤ α. Then ρ⌈β is the representation of β such that ρ⌈β = ρ⌈{ρ γ ; γ < β}.
Thus ρ⌈β is a representation of β. ρ β is the ρ-smallest element majorising Rng(ρ⌈β) if some such ρ β exists (if β = α then ρ⌈α = ρ while ρ α is not defined).
Definition 13 Let M be a structure, 1. Let α be a countable ordinal. Then α is (implicitly) definable in M iff there is ρ a representation of α which is (implicitly) definable in M.
The smallest undefinable ordinal in M will be denoted by Ord(M).
We can see the following:
1. every α > Ord(M) is undefinable in M. I.e., the set of definable ordinals in M is an interval.
2. 0, 1, . . . ω are definable in M.
3. If α, β are definable in M then α + β and α.β are definable in M. Hence Ord(M) is a limit ordinal.
Now we shall define two important concepts: the concept of iterated truth predicate over a well-ordering, T r M,c,ρ , and the notion of iteration of a general operation over a well-ordering.
For β < α we define
. . a n ∈ ω n+1 ; Z(a 0 , . . . a n ) and a 0 ≺ ρ ρ β }
We will say that Z = REK n (B, F, ρ) iff Z satisfies the following conditions
We note that 1. Z = REK(B, F, ρ) as defined above exists and is unique, 2. the definition of REK n (B, F, ρ) can be rewritten as a formula scheme, as we state in the following proposition.
which has a proper implicit definition in M with the following property: for every B ⊆ N n and ρ a representation of an ordinal
Later, we shall see that every set which is implicitly definable in M is also definable in terms of some REK n (B, F, ρ) , where all B, F, ρ are definable in M.
Definition 15 Let R be a linear ordering. Let M be a structure, and c a coding for M.
1. We will say that R and c are compatible iff Dom(c) ∩ Rng(R) = ∅ 2. For U ⊆ ω 2 we shall write that U ∈ T r(M, c, R) iff the following is satisfied:
, where M <n is the structure M + { 1 U (m, .); m < R n} and c n is the coding induced on M <n (by U and c). R is a well-ordering then T r M,c,ρ is the set such that T r(M, c, R) = {T r M,c,R }.
If
Clearly, if ρ is a well-ordering compatible with c then T r M,c,ρ can be defined as an iteration of adding a truth predicate along the well-ordering ρ. In this case we have T r(M, c, ρ) = {T r M,c,ρ }. We will see in the last section that T r(M, c, ρ) is non-empty even for linear orderings which are not well-orderings; in that case U will not in general be unique. Here, we shall deal with T r(M, c, ρ) only in the case ρ is a well-ordering.
The main results about T r M,c,ρ presented below are that i) it is strong enough to define all sets of the form REK(B, F, ρ), for B, F being definable and ii) we can characterise the Tarski hierarchy by sets of the form T r M,c,ρ with ρ definable in M.
Proposition 15
1. There is T R ⋆ : P (ω 2 ) → P (ω) which has a proper implicit definition in A with the following property: let M be a structure, ρ a representation of an ordinal α and c a coding for M compatible with ρ. Then T r M,c,ρ = REK n (T r M,c , T R ⋆ , ρ). 
Moreover, there exists a function T RO
: P (ω 2,2 ) → P (ω 2 )
for every β < α we have
A + 2 T r M,c,ρ⌈(β+1) ∼ A + 1 T r M,c,ρ (ρ β , .) 2. ρ⌈β is definable in A + 2 T r M,c,ρ⌈β .
If β ≤ α let us define
Assume that β is a limit ordinal and that ρ is a representation of α ≥ β such that ρ⌈β is definable in M + P . Assume that for every γ < β, REK n (B, F, ρ⌈(γ + 1)) is definable in M. Then REK n (B, F, ρ⌈β) is definable in M + P .
Proof. Let θ be a proper implicit definition of F in M + P . Let η be a definition of ρ⌈β in M + P . Let R θ be a formula scheme in M + P which is a proper implicit definition of the function REK F (see Proposition 14). Let η ′ (x, y, z) be the formula η(x, y) ∧ η(y, z). Then for every a = ρ γ , γ < β, we have Ext(η ′ (x, y, a)) = ρ⌈(γ + 1), and if a ∈ O ρ⌈β then Ext(η ′ (x, y, a)) = ∅. Since REK n (B, F, ρ⌈γ)(ρ 0 , .) = B then B is definable in M. Let ξ be a definition of B in M. Let S be the scheme
Then for every a = ρ γ Z ⊆ ω n+1 satisfies S(a) iff Z = REK n [B, F, ρ⌈(γ + 1)], and if a ∈ O ρ⌈β then S(a) is satisfied by ∅ only. In M we can define the relation Q ⊆ N 2 such that Q(a, b) iff b is a P -code of a set Z ⊆ ω n which satisfies S(a). Because we assumed that REK n (B, F, ρ⌈(γ + 1)), γ < β is definable in M and P is a universal predicate for M then i) for every a = ρ γ+1 , γ < β, Q(a, .) = ∅ and furthermore ii) if m ∈ Q(a, .) and a = ρ γ , γ < β then m is a P -code of REK n (B, F, ρ γ ), and if a ∈ O ρ⌈β then P (m, .) = ∅.
Hence the following are equivalent
But this equivalence can be written as a definition of REK n (B, F, ρ⌈β) in M + P QED Proposition 18 Let M be a structure. Let F : F, ρ) , where ρ is a representation of α. Let c be a coding for M compatible with ρ. Then Z is definable in M + T r M,c,ρ .
Proof. Let us prove by induction that for every β ≤ α, Z β := REK n (B, F, ρ⌈β) is definable in M β := A + 2 T r M,c,ρ⌈β . Assume that α > 0, otherwise the proposition is trivial. We have Z 0 = ∅ and Z 1 = {ρ 0 } × B which are definable in A and resp. in c,ρ⌈1 ). Assume the statement holds for every γ < β. Assume that β is isolated. Then Z β−1 is definable in M β−1 . We have
But F is definable in M and therefore F (Z β−1 ) and hence Z β are definable already in
Assume that β is a limit. By the assumption, every Z γ , γ < β is definable in N ′ := A + { 2 T r M,c,ρ⌈γ ; γ < β}. By Lemma 16, 2) we have N ′ ∼ A + { 1 T r M,c,ρ⌈β (ρ γ , .); γ < β} and hence every Z γ , γ < β, is definable in M <β . We shall apply Lemma 17. Let us check that the assumptions of the lemma are satisfied. By Lemma 16,1) ρ⌈β is definable in M β . By Lemma 16,3) a universal predicate for M <β is definable in M β . Hence, by Lemma 17, Z β is definable in M β . QED Lemma 19 Let N be a L-finite structure and c a coding for N . Let ρ be a representation of ordinal α compatible with c. Let β ≤ α and let M <β , c β be as defined in Lemma 16, 3) . Let P be a universal predicate for M <β such that ρ⌈β is definable in M <β + P . Then T r M <β,c β is definable in M <β + P .
Proof. Let us first show that T r M,c,ρ⌈β is definable in A + P .
Assume that β is isolated. Then 1 T r N ,c,ρ (ρ β−1 , .) ∈ M <β and hence it is definable in A + P . But from Lemma 16,1) we have A + 1 T r J,c,ρ (ρ β−1 , .) ∼ A + 2 T r M,c,ρ⌈β and T r M,c,ρ (ρ β , .) is definable in A + P . Assume that β is limit. We shall use Lemma 17 (note that Proposition 15 asserts that T r M,c,ρ = REK(T r M,c , T R ⋆ , ρ) where T R ⋆ has a proper implicit definition). From Lemma 16 we have 
The same is true for the proper universal predicate and proper Tarski hierarchy.
Proof. We shall say that c is an ultracanonic coding for a structure M iff T r M,c is definable in every M + P , where P is a universal predicate for M. From Lemma 8 and Proposition 6 we obtain the following:
Assume that N 1 has an ultracanonic coding c 1 . Then N 2 has a canonic universal predicate and if P is a canonic universal predicate for N 2 then A + T r N1,c1 ∼ A + P . Assume that β, ρ, M, c are as in the statement 2). By transfinite induction we shall prove the proposition: For every α ≤ β it is the case that α < λ(N ). Moreover, if P α denotes the canonic universal predicate for
First, let α = 0. Then α < λ(J). From the definition of T r M,c,ρ we obtain T r N ,c,ρ (ρ 0 , .) = T r M,c . Furthermore, since N is finite then any coding for N is ultracanonic (Proposition 9). Hence A + 1 T r M,c ∼ A + P 0 and so A + 1 T r N ,c,ρ (ρ 0 , .) ∼ A + P 0 . Let 0 < α ≤ β and assume that the proposition is true for every γ < α. Let M ′ be the structure
Let M <α denote the structure on the right hand side and let c α be the coding induced on M <α . By the previous Lemma, c α is an ultracanonic coding for M α and hence M α has a canonic universal predicate and if P α is a canonic universal predicate for M α then A + T r M<α,cα ∼ A + P α . But from the definition of T r M,c,ρ we have T r M<α,cα = T r N ,c,ρ (ρ α , .); hence A + P α ∼ A + 1 T r N ,c,ρ (ρ α , .). For the proper Tarski hierarchy the proof is exactly the same. QED Corollary 1 Let {M α } α<λ(J) be a Tarski hierarchy over N . Let β be isolated, let c be a coding for M. Let ρ be a definable representation of the ordinal β in N compatible with c. Then
Proof. Follows from the previous Theorem and Lemma 16. QED
Trees and the second half of Theorem 1
We now proceed to prove the rest of Theorem 1, i.e., to show that λ(N ) = Ord(N ) and that M λ(N ) = I(N ). We shall first prove the theorem (see page 19)
Theorem 21 Let N be a L-finite structure, let {M α } α<λ(N ) be a Tarski hierarchy over N . Then M Ord(N ) ∼ I(N ).
Second, we will prove (see page 21)
Lemma 32 Let N be a structure. Let T be a set of binary predicates such that i) every X ∈ T is of the form 2 T r N ,c,ρ , where ρ is a well-ordering definable in N compatible with coding c and ii) for every α < Ord(M) there exists ρ a representation of β ≥ α definable in N and a coding c for N such that 2 T r N ,c,ρ ∈ T . Then I(N ) ∼ A + T . In order to prove Theorem 22, we shall find a linear ordering R definable in N such that ord(R) = Ord(N ). This will be achieved by means of a formula scheme in N such that ord(ψ) = Ord(N ). It must be noted that ord(ψ) ≤ Ord(N ) but the condition ord(ψ) < Ord(N ) in general holds just for schemes which implicitly define a set. In N there may exist systems defined by a scheme ψ such that the characteristic ordinal of ψ is not definable in N .
Proof. I(N )
Observe that for a formula ψ defining a nonempty system A if ord(ψ) < Ord(M) then, by Lemma 28, there is some A ∈ A implicitly definable in M. Hence, if for every formula scheme in M, ord(ψ) < Ord(M) then every non-empty system definable contains an implicitly definable set in M. This is the essence of the folowing definition.
Definition 22 Let M be a structure. Then M is implicitly complete iff every non-empty system definable in M contains an implicitly definable set in M.
Lemma 33 Let M be a structure. If for every R a linear ordering definable in M, ord(R) < Ord(M) then M is implicitly complete.
Proof. We can assume that M is finite. Let ψ be a scheme in M in a prenex form which defines a non-empty system A. Let τ be the characteristic tree. KB τ is definable in M and by the assumption there is ord(KB τ ) < Ord(M). We can find a definable representation ρ in M of an ordinal β, ord(KB τ ) < β < Ord(M). We can assume that ρ is compatible with a coding c for M. The set T r M,c,ρ is implicitly definable in M and by Lemma 28 there is some A ∈ A definable in A + 2 T r M,c,ρ . QED
In definition 15 we introduced T r(M, c, R),which is a generalisation of the concept of T r M,c,ρ if R is not a well-ordering. Similarly to Proposition 15 we may obtain: There is a system S ⊆ P (ω 2,2,2 ) definable in A such that for every structure M and a coding c for M and a linear ordering R, D M,c , R, U ∈ S iff U ∈ T r(M, c, R)
Lemma 34 Let N be a L-finite structure, c a coding for N . Let R be a linear ordering compatible with c such that Ord(N ) ≤ ord(R). Let U ∈ T r(N , c, R). If x ∈ Rng(R) \ wo(R) then there is a universal predicate for I(N ) definable in A + 1 U (x, .).
Proof. For n ∈ N let U n ⊆ N 2 be a relation such that U n (a, b) iff U (a, b) and R(a, n), let R n be defined as on page 10. For n ∈ wo(R) we have U n = T r N ,c,Rn . Since Ord(N ) ≤ ord(R) then for every ordinal α definable in N there is some n ∈ wo(R) such that R n is a representation for α. Therefore, using Lemma 32, every set implicitly definable in N is definable in N + { 2 U n ; n ∈ wo(N )} ∼ N + { 1 U (n, .); n ∈ wo(N )} (see Lemma 16). The set U (x, .) is defined to be a truth predicate for the structure M := A+{ 1 U (y, .); y ≺ R x)}. A proper universal predicate P for M is therefore definable in A+ 1 U (x, .). But I(J) ⊆ D(N +{ 2 U (n, .); n ∈ wo(N )}) ⊆ M and hence P is a universal predicate for I(N ). QED Proposition 35 Let N be a L-finite structure. Then N is not implicitly complete.
Proof. Let N be a L-finite structure and c a coding for N . In N we can find a formula scheme in ψ ∈ F le 2,2,1,3 1 (N ) such that for every R, U, X, Y ∈ P (ω 2,2,1,3 ), R, U, X, Y satisfies ψ iff
